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RELIGION AND SCIENCE.
BY EDWARD C. HEGELER.
The aim of The Open Court was criticised in a late
number of The Nation in the following way :
" The profession of .'"/;.' Open Court is to make an ' effort to
conciliate religion with science.' Is this wise ? Is it not an en-
deavor to reach a toredetermined conclusion ? And is not that an
anti-scientific, anti-philosophical aim ? Does not such a struggle
imply a defect of intellectual integrity and tend to undermine the
whole moral heahh ? Surely, religion is apt to be compromised
by attempts at conciliation. Tell the Czar of all the Rassias you
will conciliate autocracy with individualism ; but do not insult re-
ligion by offering to conciliate it with any other impulse or devel-
opment of human nature whatever. Religion, to be true to itself,
should demand the unconditional surrender of free-thinking.
Science, true to itself, cannot listen to such a demand for an in-
stant. There may be some possible reconciliation between the
religious impulse and the scientific impulse ; and no fault can be
found with a man for believing himself to be in possession of the
solution of the difficulty (except that his reasoning may be incon-
clusive), or for having faith that such a solution will in time be
discovered. But-to go about to search out that solution, thereby
dragging religion before the tribunal of free thought, and commit-
ting philosophy to finding a given proposition true—is this a wise
or necessary proceeding ' Why should not religion and science
seek each a self-development in its own interest, and then if, as
they approach completion, they are found to come more and more
into accord, will not that be a more satisfactory result than forci-
bly bending them together now in a way whic'i can only disfigure
both ? For the present, a religion which believes in itself should
not mind what science says ; and science is long past caring one
fig for the thunder of the theologians."*
Religion is the sphere of those ideas which have
been impressed into man to support him in the vicis-
situdes of life and to comfort him in affliction, but es-
pecially in order to regulate his conduct. When we
speak of ideas as religious, we also mean thereby that
the3> are our innermost conviction.
Wherever religious ideas are taught, we are con-
fronted with the doctrine that there is a great- power
that punishes or destroys those who are disobedient to
the religious commands.
From our religious instruction has resulted this
prominent idea : ' ' Strive and struggle for truth every-
where, but above all in the very highest and most
* Our critic in a certain sense revokes his criticism, he says : " However,
these objections apply mainly to The Open Court's profession, scarcely at all
to its practice On the whole. The Open Court is marked by sound and
enlightened ideas, and the fact that it can by any means find support does
honor to Chicago." But if the profession is wrong, how can the practice be
correct ?
important field—Religion. Our critic proposes the
maxim that we should remain passive with regard to
a conciliation of Religion and Science. But a passive
state of abeyance, according to our religious view,
is irreligious and immoral.
The question is raised by our critic : " Is not the
profession of The Open Court to conciliate religion
with science a predetermined conclusion and therewith
an unscientific and unphilosophical aim ?" We an-
swer, " It is a religious aim, and also it is not an un-
scientific aim." It appears that among the religious
ideas of our critic there is one which in his soul pre-
dominates over all the others, viz., that "Religion to
be true to itself should demand an unconditional sur-
render of freethinking.
"
We were educated in the so-called Christian Ration-
alism while our critic apparently belongs to some or-
thodox school. Religion, accordingly, we were taught,
must be in accord with scie/ice. What are presented to us
as conclusions based on science may be in part erro-
neous, and amongst the religious ideas taught us there
may also be erroneous ones. The substance of our re-
ligious instruction was that all those ideas taught to
us as the Christian religion, which already appeared
to the teacher as untenable or might still be found
to be erroneous, were unessential.
Those ideas which are in conflict with science we
have to drop
;
yet, at the same time, we must be
careful not to drop any more. To drop that part of
religion which is not in conflict with science is a mis-
take almost universally made.
The maxim that errors should be dropped was not
always directly pronounced, yet it was impressed upon
us by example. Thus, for instance, the Mosaic account
of the creation was no longer believed by our teachers,
nor were we asked to believe it ; we were not instructed
to believe that Joshua really made the sun stand still in
the valley of Gibeon, nor that Jonah came alive out of
the whale ; nor were we very seriously asked to be-
lieve in a trinity. Irrational faith was never upheld
or recommended. But at the s.ame time the convic-
tion was most positively impressed into us that the
essence of religion would be found to be true ; it will
remain. And this proposition is supported by Science.
Mr. Herbert Spencer has pointed out the extreme
improbability that there should not be some impor-
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tant truth in ideas which are so old and so widely
spread. He says concerning the religious ideas en-
tertained by men since time immemorial :
• "We must admit that the convictions entertained by many
minds in common are the most likely to ha%'e some foundation."
Herein we fully agree with Mr. Spencer, but then
Mr. Spencer makes the mistake of concluding that the
mysterious or the unknowable is this important truth.
He says :
"Religions diamitrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are
yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the
world with all it contains and all which surrounds it, is a mystery
ever pressing for interpretation,"
And this mystery, Mr. Spencer declares, is "not
a relative, but an absolute mystery."
From the Mysterious or Unknowable no ethics can
be deduced, and Mr. Spencer himself has not at-
tempted it. He makes the happiness of mankind the
basis of ethics.
In opposition to Mr. Spencer we maintain, that
the important truth which is in common to all religions,
is this :
All religions teach that there is some power which
enforces a certain line of conduct by man.
The savage worships his fetish not because it ap-
pears mvstcriotis to him, but because he believes in its
pOKwr.
The Religion that was taught us has gradually be-
come the Religion of Nature, for we now recognize
this power in Nature.* Nature enforces the further
evolution of mankind. Those men who do not
take part in this further evolution must perish. The
highest civilized man will survive. In this we believe
to be "in the possession of the solution of the diffi-
culty," as our critic expresses himself; and this solu-
tion is very nearly the same as that which Matthew
Arnold embodied in the sentence :
" There is a power, not ourselves, that makes for righteous-
ness."
We would alter Matthew Arnold's sentence in this
way : There is a power that enforces a certain line of
conduct in the domain of life, and it is this line of con-
duct enforced by that power, which we call righteous-
ness.
A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT.
BY MADAME E. FLEURV ROBINSON.
Those interested in social advancement have cer-
tainly read of the attempts which have been made from
time to time, to realize the many theories tending to
improve the condition of mankind.
The Icarian Community, as an example of a life in
common, has great illustrative value. Having no
special religious creed, the principles of its members
* Mankind is a part of Nature.
were exalted into a religion, without Christ, the Bible,
or Theology. Its government was simply democratic
;
its system one of pure communism in propertj'. Ro-
mantic and interesting, the history of Icaria is also the
saddest of all communistic histories, and deserves
special study.
Speaking especially of the Amana Inspirationists,
a German Community in Iowa, the largest and most
prosperous of existing communities, Mr. Albert Shaw,
in the preface of a little study entitled "Icaria," says:
" Its History is as superior to that of Amana for the
student of social science, as the history of Greece is
superior to that of China for the study of political
science. Yet while other communities have pros-
pered, Icaria has perished ; while others became
wealthy and lived peaceably, Icaria has struggled
with poverty and dissensions."
A social movement tending to the emancipation of
society and the establishment of apolitical democracy,
had, in 1848, gained man}' partisans in France. The
events of the first French revolution had taught men
the meaning of equal rights.
The doctrines of Voltaire, Rousseau, and other
great philosophers, were studied by the proletairc,
and a generation later the workingman had become a
thinking man. The life of M. Etienne Cabet, the
founder of the Icarian Community, illustrates the
transformation of society at this time. He was born
in France at Dijon, capital of the department of Cote-
d'Or, in 1788. He was the son of a cooper. His edu-
cation was begun under a great patriot, the celebrated
Jacotot. Later the study of medicine engaged him,
but he soon abandoned this for the more congenial
study of law, in the practice of which he acquired
great reputation in his native city.
When later he transferred his residence to Paris,
he made a name as a politician, editor, and historical
writer. He took an active part in the revolution of
1830, which, however, disappointed him because it
accomplished so little for democratic principles. When
the coterie of Thiers, Guizot, and Lafitte had suc-
ceeded in placing Louis Philippe on the throne, the
men who had hastened the revolution had to be con-
ciliated, and the office of Procureur General in Cor-
sica was given M. Cabet. Soon, however, he was re-
moved, but his countrymen of the Cote d'Or had al-
ready elected him deputy, and he took his seat with
the extreme radicals. When his denunciations of the
ministry and his outspoken attitude in the chamber of
' deputies could be no longer tolerated by the govern-
ment, he was given the choice of two years of im-
prisonment or five years of exile. He preferred the
latter and chose to reside in England. It was there
that he determined to experiment in practical com-
munism, not by physical force and revolt against es-
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tablished institutions, so dreaded by the prosperous
classes, but by peaceful industry and happy brother-
hood.
He published a book, Le Voyage en Icarie, a
romance where his new doctrines were expounded in
popular style. It is a volume of social philosophy,
describing the social arrangement prevailing in a hap-
py country where the government, the arts, and the
sciences, and popular welfare have attained perfec-
tion. On the title page elaborately arranged were the
mottoes :" One for all. " "All for one." " To live is
the first right." "To work the first duty." The
words, Education, Morality, Peace, Justice, summed
up M. Cabet's philosophy. The book was received
with enthusiasm and was read eagerly. It was clear,
practical, and wise. It gave to Christ the highest
place as a teacher of the doctrines of human brother-
hood, of unselfishness, and of social equality.
He founded a paper, the Populaire to dissemi-
nate his ideas, and from 1843 to 1847 he printed many
controversial pamphlets. His scheme became the
topic for all the journalists, and everything relating to
his principles was eagerly read. It is said that in
1848, the adherents of the Icarian doctrine numbered
400,000 souls. Among the better classes of artisans
in Germany, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, where the
French language could be read, the movement at-
tracted attention. To escape persecution and end
controversy, and, on the other hand, to satisfy his san-
guine friends, he decided to realize his Icaria and vin-
dicate his doctrines. In May, 1847, a proclamation
appeared in the Populaire signed "Cabet. " ' It
promised a terrestrial paradise, peace, and plenty,
with the hope of extending these blessings to the world
at large. As the result of a conference between M.
Cabet and the great English reformer, Robert Owen,
it was announced that the choice of the location of
Icaria was limited to three localities in the United
States, for it had been thought best to emigrate to that
country.
Owen, who had already visited the Mexican coun-
try, undoubtedly advised him to choose Texas, and in
the Populaire of Januar}' 17th, 1848, an announcement
was made that one million of acres in Texas had been
secured. The suitableness of the country for a great
emigration was set forth, and preparations for the
settlement of the colony were made at once.
On the morning of the 3d of Februar}' on the
wharves at Havre, there assembled the advance guard
of sixty-nine chosen men. Fifteen hundred were soon
to follow. A ceremony, that of making response to a
series of questions, some of which had reference to
the sincerity of the new disciples, and their willingness
to endure privations for the realization of their doc-
trines, made the scene an impressive one. Thus the
advance guard left Havre, singing a farewell patriotic
hymn amid a thousand cries of " Au revoir ! "
As the ship bearing the pioneers approached their
new home, the booming of cannon was heard, an-
nouncing to the people of New Orleans the establish-
ment of the second republic in France. This political
change in the mother country at this time was the
cause of the division among the future Icarians. Some
were in favor of recalling the advance guard, hoping
that France might be the theatre for the realization of
their theories ; others led by M. Cabet maintained
that the government was hostile to communistic ideas.
The body of Icarians was severed, and instead of the
fifteen hundred who were to follow the advance guard,
only nineteen came. Meanwhile, the first band had
reached the place selected for the settlement, June
1S48.
To dwell on the hardships and sickness which dis-
pirited them ; the difficulties they encountered in lo-
cating their land, would be too sad a storJ^ They re-
solved to abandon Texas. Five were left to meet the
second advance guard to whom this news could not be
sent, and who had already landed ; the rest retreated
to New Orleans, leaving the sick and dying on the
way. The leader of the second band a few days after
their arrival at Texas wrote a letter to M. Cabet tell-
ing him of the suffering endured by the few who had
remained, of the death of others, and of their em-
barrassed circumstances, but M. Cabet published this
discouraging news much later, when he laid the blame
of the failure on the too great zeal of the pioneers and
the events of the Revolution. The causes of the dis-
aster, however, were mismanagement, and lack of
money.
The settlement in Texas was finall}' given up alto-
gether, and the remnant of the first and the second
advance guards reached New Orleans. In the mean-
time four hundred more Icarians had arrived, and M.
Cabet landed there in January, 1849. The society
never having had a firm financial basis, they soon
lacked funds to provide for the newly arrived mem-
bers. M. Cabet had hoped that the great ideas upon
which the society was based, would open many purse
strings ; but being disappointed in this, a plan was
devised to raise the needed capital. All new members
should pay six hundred francs or give up all their prop-
erty ; a loan might be effected on -the real estate of
the future Icaria ; a bank could be established, and
other ethereal schemes formed, the basis upon which
the enthusiastic followers of M. Cabet relied.
We find now our pioneers numbering four hundred
and eighty souls, and their leader in New Orleans
with a treasury containing eighty-six thousand francs,
about thirty five dollars per capita.
The dream of a million acres in Tex is had faded
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away, enthusiasm was dampened, discussions were
frequent, and not always harmonious. The pioneers,
some wishing to return to France, others to find a
more suitable district than Texas, were living in a few
large brick houses in New Orleans. Exploring par-
ties were sent out in search of a new location. Mean-
while two hundred withdrew with one third of the
eighty-six thousand francs, the other two hundred and
eighty remained with M. Cabet, to locate in a new
home, just discovered.
This new home seemed providentially prepared for
them. In 1840 Joe. Smith and his followers had built
the town of Nauvoo on a magnificent tract of land.
Nauvoo was then the largest town in Illinois, number-
ing fifteen thousand inhabitants.
When Brigham Young organized the migration to
Salt Lake, the Mormon property in Nauvoo was left
in charge of an agent. This was an excellent oppor-
tunity for the Icarians. The houses were good, the
land well cultivated and could be rented at a nominal
figure. It was a great relief for them, homesick and
dispirited as they were, and with but scanty capital.
They arranged their social life as well as circumstances
permitted, and tried sincerely to carry out the ideas
which had brought them so far through sickness, pri-
vation, and disappointment.
We find them after a few years of prosperit}' num-
bering about five hundred. The Icarians in France
hearing the good news, were now anxious to join the
prosperous settlement, and many families, well-to-do
at home, sold their all, and severed ties of family and
friendship to come and begin the new mode of life.
New members came from time to time, and with
their means and labor added to the prosperity of the
colony. In the space of five years, they had acquired
property, they had workshops, farms, a flouring mill,
and distillery, and were comfortable. They had a
school for the children, boys and girls being taught
separately. The children were taken to school as
boarders and not allowed to communicate with those
outside. The parents could come on Sunday after-
noons to stay with their children or to take them home
as they might wish.
M. Cabet's intention had been to build the school
several miles awaj' from the settlement ; his hope lay
especially in a new generation, instructed and directed
by teachers chosen by him. The}' were charged to
train the children in manners, morals, and Icarian
principles.
Being together as children of one family, they soon
learned to love each other. There was no occasion
for pride, envy, or jealousy ; all dressed alike, ate the
same food, enjoyed the same amusements. Having
no money, none could procure for themselves what
others could not have, and the time and thought wasted
in thinking what could be obtained to exhibit wealth,
could be used for better purposes.
Mottoes were framed and hung in the class-room,
refectory, dormitories, and halls, reminding the pupils
that they were children of a people who were called
to carry out a new and great principle.
The industry of the members, their peaceful and
orderly habits caused them to be esteemed by their
American neighbors. Although far from the ideal
Icarians in M. Cabet's romance, they were a social
and intellectual people, living, I am sure, a better life
than can ordinarily be done under the system of in-
dividualism.
I shall in my next article give some personal re-
miniscences, for it was about this time that my parents
decided to join the community at Nauvoo.
[to be concluded.]
THE MONISM OF "THE OPEN COURT" CRITICALLY
EXAMINED.
BY EDMUND MONTGOMERY.
A SET of " definitions explanatory of the position
oi The Open Court" will be found prefixed to thirty-
five successive numbers of the paper, from No. 90-125.
It is to be expected, therefore, that these " defini-
tions" have been carefully considered and worded, so
as to express accurately the leading views it desires
to propound.
Such convenient extract of essentials, condensed
from the astonishing array of expository and critical
knowledge displayed by The Open Court is a lucky cir-
cumstance for one who finds himself called upon to
point out the weak places in so stupendous a pantology.
Monism is there defined as: "that philosophy
which recognizes the oneness of All-existence." It
does not say : Monism is that view of nature which
presupposes the oneness of all existence ; or that phi-
losoph}' which endeavors to establish the fact of the
oneness of all existence. It positively asserts that all
natural appearances and occurrences form part of an
"All" or "All-existence," and that Monism is the phi-
losophy which demonstrates the truth of this fact. This,
at least, is what it intends to say. For it makes no
sense at all to speak—as it does— of the object of phi-
losophical recognition as the "oneness of All-exis-
tence." By calling the supposed totality of natural
phenomena the " All " or " AH- existence ", its one-
ness is already maintained as recognized, and need,
consequently, not be re-recognized. "All-existence"
m'eans, as such, oneness of all existence, without
further ado.
But the question really in need of philosophical
elucidation is : whether or not all natural phenomena,
all modes of being, do actuall}' make up a unitary to-
tality of existence, a supreme world-constituting
"All."
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It is clear that the "All" or "All-existence" of
The Open Court is altogether, or at least very nearly,
identical with what naturalistic Pantheists call the All-
Being, or the One and All, the iv uai nav, dens sive
iiatiira. The Open Court, then, advocates, to begin
with, a pantheistic creed, or what it prefers to call a
religious "faith." And its philosophy consists, or
ought to consist, in the demonstration of its truth ; the
demonstration, namely, that all modes of being are in
reality forming part of one and the same All-Being.
Now, in what manner does The Open Court attack
this ancient and formidable problem ;—a problem first
philosophically propounded by the Eleatic sages ; fig-
uring then all through Antiquity as the problem of the
One and the Many; resuscitated in modern times by
Bruno, by Spinoza, by Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel
;
and at present vigorously brought forward again by
our Neo-Kantians ? How does The Open Court set
about demonstrating the oneness of all modes of exist-
ence ; the oneness above all of thought and being, of
subjective awareness and objective reality, of the
world figured in consciousness and the world outside
of it?
It sets about it by placing at the head of its defi-
nitions the most debatable of all philosophical propo-
sitions. It asserts that "the data of experience are
perceptions." In this innocent looking little nutshell
of a proposition lies snugly encased the entire world-
deep mystery of thought and being, and with it the
fate of every monistic persuasion.
First of all, it is clear that not only perceptions,
but also such imperceptible states of being, as hunger
thirst and other appetites, as love, hope and other
emotions, are furnishing manifold and distinct data of
experience quite different from those of perception.
Indeed in our human life these imperceptible states
of being pla}' an overwhelmingly significant part, to
which perceptions are hardl}' more than incidental in-
citements.
But as an axiom upon which Tlie Open Court
grounds its Monism, what does it really mean by
"perceptions", by this its only fund of experiential
material? Where, we must ask, are perceptions, as
modes of existence, actually located ? Can there be
a doubt that they have their existence within the per-
ceiving individual ? They arise by means of sense-
stimulation in organic beings as part of their inner
awareness or conscious content. The Open Court
does not deny this. On the contrary it firmly asserts
it. Consequently, it virtually maintains in its leading
axiom or definition, that the data of experience, namely
what we find given to the cognitive faculty out
of which to constitute our world-conception ; that this
the only mode of existence of which we are directly
cognizant, is of a mental or conscious nature. For
"perceptions", its sole avowed data of experience, are
incontestably, as such, of conscious consistency ; are,
in fact, our own mental states.
And here, at the outset, the fundamental, inevasible
alternative offers itself to philosophical choice. A pos-
itive decision, one way or the other, is peremptorily
called for. The Open Court, if it desires to be con-
sistent, philosophic, scientific, and not merely to rum-
mage among the medley of philosophical surmises in
search of plausible support for its preconceived faith
;
— if it desires to take rank among serious thought, it
will find itself—on the strength of its first and leading
proposition—either driven to pure Idealism, or forced
to acknowledge that perceptions signalize a reality
beyond themselves. The first decision would trans-
form its eclectic faith into straightforward Spiritualism,
in which case it might rightfully continue to call itself
Monism. The second decision would unavoidably en-
tangle it in the despised labyrinthine intricacies of
what it takes to be agnostic Dualism, the very mode
of thought against which its missionary warfare is
chiefly directed. And then in this latter instance, if
it had sufficient courage and patience still to hold on
to its monistic faith, it would find itself burdened with
the genuine monistic problem ; the problem, namely,
of showing that mental phenomena and physical phe-
nomena—that which we call mind and that which we
call matter—are in truth modes of appearance or phe-
nomenal manifestations of one and the same under-
lying reality. And a further task would devolve upon
7%,? Open Court, the task to show that this reality,
symbolically signalized by perceptions, constitutes in
verity a godlike "All."
Either pure Idealism or inferential Realism. I can
detect no other consistent position. If The Open
Court will work out its conception that reality consists
in the thorough- going interaction of all modes of
existence, as constituting a Godlike "All," and as
actuall}' present in perception and cognition, and not
merely signalized as something subsisting in extra-
conscious latency ; if it will unflinchingly pursue
this train of thought, it will arrive at conclusions
similar to those of the late Professor Green and of our
present Transcendental Idealists. If, on the other
hand, it accepts as truth the mere symbolical or repre-
sentative nature of the conscious states awakened in
us, and their reference to an extra-conscious world
beyond and outside our mental realization of it, then
it will have to come to some such conclusion, as I
have myself expressed in No. 20 of The Open Court.
"The truth we recognize by means of our human
faculties is not the content of the consciousness of a
supreme and all-efficient Intelligence ; but simply the
relations actually subsisting between the existents of
our perceptible world, to which we also wholly be-
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long." "Nothing supernatural is to be found behind
the sensible phenomena. Our percepts faithfully repre-
sent the sundry characteristics of the outside existents
which are affecting our senses ; and so far as this is
the case these outside existents are thoroughly well
known to us." But known, of course, only symbolic-
ally as represented through perceptions within the
medium of individual consciousness.
Will The Open Court decide for one or the other
alternative ; or will it switch off onto some side track ?
The latter seems to be the case. For in the same
number from which I happened to glean its monistic
definitions, (No. 112, p. 1893), I find it stated, that
" so long as the law of the conservation of energy
and matter remains unrefuted, the monistic concep-
tion of the world will stand unshaken." And a little
further on I discover- that The Open Court, in its
eagerness to put Agnosticism to the rout, has become
uncompromisingly materialistic. It maintains with-
out winking, that "the reality itself, the world, the
All," is identical with "the totality of matter and
energy."
Now, the orthodox science of the material universe,
when it speaks of the law of the conservation of energy,
means always, unswervingly, mechanical energy im-
pelling inert matter. Never, by any chance, does it,
or can it mean some sort of hylozoistic muddle, where
energy may produce mind as well as motion, and
where matter may feel and think as well as move. In
the material conception of the world there is, as ex-
plained in my previous article, and indeed as settled
long ago, no room whatever for mind, no legitimate
transition from the universe of matter and motion to
that of mental states, no monistic gangway to the in-
wardness of things. It leads simply and irreconcila-
bly to the thorough-going dualism of body and mind,
of matter and spirit.
According to " the law of the conservation of energy
and matter," on the strength of which The Open Court
assures us "the monistic conception of the world
will stand unshaken," it incontrovertibly follows, that
mental states, "perceptions" included, do not form
part of "the reahty itself, the world, the All, the
totality of matter and energy." And we have, more-
over, consistently to conclude that the god-like " All "
of The Open Court is nothing but a vast congeries of
inert material particles, moved about, and made to
collide and aggregate by force of mechanical impulsion
.
All this, however, by the way. For The Open Court
is out and out materialistic only when it helps it to
thwart some phase or other of Agnosticism.
What we are particularly anxious to learn is, how
The Open Court gets at all legitimately to infer from
" perceptions," its sole avowed data of experience, the
existence of " actual energy " and " real matter." For
what it so positively proclaims as the stronghold of
its monistic faith, is the direct, open-lying, non-inferen-
tial reality of such energy and matter. How, on the
strength of mere perceptions, it gets to know matter
and energy, as they exist independently of such per-
ception, outside individual consciousness, is what I
would like to learn.
I feel pretty certain, that, by the time it succeeds
in satisfactorily settling this little question, it will find
itself drawn into the whirlpool of such Agnosticism, as
feels compelled to confess that "perceptions"—the
actually given data of experience—cannot themselves
be, or contain the true realit}', of which the permanent
things of our world are composed. And if its faith in
some kind of Monism remains then still " unshaken,"
it will have a long and difficult path to travel, in order
to arrive at a rationally sound foundation for it.
How shaky the ground really is, on which The
Open Court is now basing its Monism, can be further
gathered from the definitions immediately following
its leading enunciation, that "the data of experience
are perceptions." It asserts next, that " reality is the
sum total of all that is." And then it goes on to state,
that "truth is the comformity of cognition to reality."
This last sentence tells us plainly that there is first
"reality," and then "cognition" of it ; that, conse-
quently, reality is after all not "the sum total of all
that is."
It seems, indeed, obvious that the cognitive pro-
cess, which goes on within the subject, represents
—
through the conscious or mental medium of sensations,
perceptions and thoughts—the objective reality of a
world, which it infers as existing outside the perceiv-
ing subject, and as continuing to exist independently
of being thus occasionally perceived and cognized.
By distinguishing "reality" from its "cognition,"
The Open Court finds itself again unawares in the
midst of the agnostic vortex. For " perceptions," its
"data of experience," are undeniably conscious or
mental means by which the subject is led to cognize a
reality outside itself ; a reality whose existence together
with its characteristics, is consequently merely inferred
through such symbolical representation ; a realit}',
therefore, not positively known as it actually is and
persists to be, when not thus symbolically represented
in the conscious medium of the subject.
This agnostic conclusion can be evaded only in one
way, and that is by asserting that the reality which
seems to exist outside the cognizing subject, is in truth
identical with the conscious data by which it is recog-
nized ; identical with perceptions and thoughts ; iden-
tical, therefore, with mind or spirit.
Will The Open Court evade the Agnosticism in-
volved in the "Relativity of Knowledge " by frankly
joining the idealistic camp ? or will it go on shilly-
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shallying ; siding now with this, now with that mode
of thought? Its judicial power should be impartially
wielded in the faithful service of scientific truth. It
should not play the part of a biased attorney for the
defense of foregone conclusions.
Little need be said about The Open Court's "relig-
ion of Monism." It declares that it "teaches the
individual, as part of the whole, to conform to the
cosmical laws of the All"; that "religion is man's
aspiration to be in harmony with the All
"
; that
"morals are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison
with the All."
As stated in my first article, I can find no meaning
at all for these high-sounding enunciations. "The
cosmical laws of the All " are so far as I can see, prin-
cipally the law of gravitation, the law of the transmis-
sion of light, of electricity, and such like. I know v/ell
enough that we have to conform, for example, to the law
of gravitation. But I can detect no trace of religion
or morality in such conformity. On the contrary, it
may, at times, be moral, or at least eminently prudent,
strenuously to resist conformity to the law of gravita-
tion ; as, for instance, when deadly enemies meet at
the edge of a precipice. Cannibals, who slay and de-
vour their enemies conform more directly and com-
pletely to "the cosmical laws of the AH," than the
man who, Christlike, offers no violent resistance to
those who attack him.
It seems to me that the special selection and use
made by human beings of the multifarious opportuni-
ties offered by nature, is that which first of all intro-
duces the moral element into the world we know.
I am well aware that The Open Court in speaking
of "the cosmical laws of the All," has not really the
"cosmical" laws in mind, but chiefly the laws of
organic evolution. But even leaving inorganic evolu-
tion with its general cosmical laws out of account,
organic evolution—as explained by Darwinism—has
to be pronounced out and out fatalistic, and contain-
ing therefore no trace of morality. Judged by the
standard of morality, organic evolution has been
brought about by pre-eminently immoral means.
Morality enters into the process only when natural
evolution becomes controlled for ethical purposes by
man's power of rationally interfering with the other-
wise non-rational and exorbitantly cruel disposition of
nature in general. Morality is of human origin. It
emanates from the rational understanding of man's
social or hyper-individual nature.
And, as regards religion, I, for one, can find no
incitement for it in the deaf and blind cosmos, that
lies outstretched there in infinite space, insensible to
our joys and woes. I can detect religion, if religion
it may still be called, only in the enthusiastic devotion
lavished by generous hearts on the progressive exalta-
tion of the inner worth of human existence.
IS MONISM UNTENABLE ?
THE ONENESS OF THE ALL.
Dr. Montgomery regards the statement that monism rec-
ognizes the "oneness of the AH" as "making no sense." He
says :
" By calling the supposed totality of natural phenomena the All or All-
" existence, its oneness is already maintained."
Dr. Montgomery accordingly believes that the words " ohp-
ness " and " all existence " are tautological. This is not so. The
All might be a combination of many disparate things. The \\\
might consist (as, for instance. Dr. Montgomery himself suggested
in his last article) of matter and of mind. There is nothing of
the concept " oneness " contained in the word "All." The All
may be a sum of many things or of two sets of order as dualis's
maintain.
.-V sum of disparate things represents no oneness. But
the All may form a unit consisting of many parts which are per-
vaded by common laws ; and the latter view is that of Monism.
If our learned friend can supply no better argument, we shall re-
tain the definition, " Monism is that philosophy which recognizes
the oneness of All-existence."
Dr. Montgomery then asks :
"Now in what manner does The Open Coari; attack this ' ancient and form-
"idable problem,' viz., that of the oneness of the All ?"
The answer ought to have been, By investigating the formal
laws of the universe, the nature of which is laid down in the formal
sciences.
The Universe appears to us as a Cosmos ; and the cosmic
order of the Universe depends upon the formal laws. So long as
the formal laws retain their universality, and so far as the
rule " twice two equals four " holds good, there is a uniformity of
nature which is the condition of all order in nature.
This has been explained at length in Fundamental Problems,
especially in the chapter Form and Formal Thought ; but Dr.
Montgomery takes no no'.ice of it ; nor does he quote any passage
in order to substantiate his condemnation or to prove a fallacy in
the arguments. There is accordingly no ground for being con-
cerned about the unfavorable verdict he pronounces.
PERCEPTIO.NS AND IMPERCEPTIBLE STATES.
Instead of investigating the answer concerning the problem of
the oneness of the All which is given in Ftmlamental Problems,
Dr. Montgomery discusses the definition which is only indirectly
connected therewith, that "the data of experience are percep-
tions."
Dr. Montgomery says :
" It is clear that not only perceptions, but also such imperceptible states
"of being, as hunger, thirst, and other appetites, as love, hope and other
"emotions are furnishing manifold and distinct data of experience, qu ite dif-
" ferent from those of perception. Indeed in our human life these impercep-
" tible states of being play an overwhelmingly significant part, to which per-
"ceptions are hardly more than incidental incitements."
Are not hunger and thirst perceived ? If they are perceived,
are they not perceptions ? Surely we must not say that they
are " imperceptible states." Dr. Montgomery seems to confound
perception with sense-perception. In saying that perceptions (i.
e., sense perceptions) are hardly more than incidental incitements,
he makes a bold assumption. If sense-perceptions were mere
incidental incitements, the origin and growth of mind, all intellec-
tual life, would be mere hap-hazard, a fortuitous effect, a mere
matter of chance.
It is strange that Dr. Montgomery calls the statement that
the data of experience are perceptions " the most debatable of all
philosophical propositions." How does this verdict agree with
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the lesson he undertook to give us in his first article concerning
"the truth that the outspread world we know is first of all our
own sense-awakened individual perception " ?
THE ONLY QUOTATION, MISQUOTED.
In discussing the views of The 0/<en Court Dr. Montgomery
simply makes sundry disconnected remarks upon a few defini-
tions ; but he avoids quoting any coherent passage. How glad I
was while perusing his criticism, to find at least one quotation. Dr.
Montgomery says of The Open Court :
" It maintains without winking that 'the reality itself, the world, the AH,'
' is itientical with ' the totality of matter and energy.'
"
Since this expression flatly contradicts those views that have
been propounded in The Open Court, and since I could not re-
member ever having used such a phrase, I looked the passage up
(in No. 112 p. 1S93, of Tlie Open C(>;«/) and found that I had made
a statement in opposition to the agnosticism of Miss Mirabeau
Brown, who believes that " all things are from one source, that
source being unknowable." I said that matter and energy, the
world, the universe have no source ; they are eternal.
The passage literally quoted runs as follows :
"But reality itself, the world, the All, the totality of matter and energy,
" has no source. It is eternal."
If a number of things or ideas are enumerated concerning all
of which it is said that they are not derived from a source, how
can that imply that these things are all identical ? These terms
are of equal value only in so far as the same thing can be predi-
cated of them. There is not one word in the passage about re-
ality being "identical with" the totality of matter and energy.
It is true ihat Dr. Montgomery does not include the clause " iden-
tical with " in quotation marks, but these two words are after all
that part of the sentence which gives sense to it. And the Doctor
in order to make this statement emphatic, adds that it is main-
tained " without winking."
The totality of matter and energy are by no means the whole
of the world For the feelings which accompany certain modes of
motion are not incltided in the term energy ; and at the same time
the forms of things are neither matter nor energy. And yet they
are of great importance. So are feelings ; and we cannot say that
they do not exist simply because they are contained in neither of
the abstractions energy and matter.
It is unfortunate for Dr. Montgomery that the passages in
which these subjects have been discussed and which stand in
flat contradiction to the view which he unwarrantably assumes
to be held by The Open Court, have entirely escaped his attention.
Tlie only quotation whicli Dr. Montgomery has made in either of
tliese articles, is a gross misquotation.
INFERENCES MADE FROM A MISQUOTATION.
Dr. Montgomery's misquotation, that the All is "identical
with " the totality of matter and energy leads him inti^ worse
blunders. He makes inferences from that statement and main-
tains that these inferences are part of our Monistic philosophy.
He says :
"It incontrovertibly follows that mental states, 'perceptions' included,
" do not form part of the reality itself."
and
"The godlike All of The Open Court is not .iiig but a vast congeries of
" inert material panicles."
That this is not so, has been repeatedly maintained in The
Open Court, in Mr. Hegeler's articles, as well as in Fundamental
Problems.
IS COGNIIION UNREAL?
Dr. Montgomery quotes the definitions : " Reality is the sum
total of all that is " ; and ' ' Truth is the conformity of cognition to
reality." He adds :
" This last sentence tells us plainly, that there is first ' reality ' and then
'cognition,' of it, that consequently, reality is after all not 'the sum total of
all that is."
I should really like to know where cognition is excluded from
reality. Every thing that exists is called real, and reality is the
sum total of all that is. Cognition is real* and things cognized if
they exist, if they are no mere illnsions, are real. If a cognizing
being attempts to follow the Delphic rule of self-knowledge, it at-
tempts to cognize itself. Is that " self " no reality ? Is it not also
an object of cognition ? If a cognition agrees with or conforms
to the cognized object, be that an outside thing or self, the cogni-
tion is called true.
MORALITY AND THE ALL.t
Dr. Montgomery maintains that he can detect " no trace of
morality " in the All, neither in the inorganic nor the organic laws
of cosmical existence. He adds : " Morality is of human origin."
I am here again at a loss how to account for Dr. Montgomery's
logic. Is the "human "not a part of the All? If it is not, it
must be supernatural, and this is a conclusion which Dr. Mont-
gomery does not accept. Dr. Montgomery looks around the
whole universe, he includes in his concept "All" everything
—
except man.
There is an old Swabian Volksincirchen about nine Gothamites
who went down to the beach to take a bath. They were bold swim-
mers and when they returned to the shore, they counted whether
their number was complete. Every one of them counted his eight
comrades and forgot himself. So they soon agreed that one of
them must have been drowned. Their grief was unspeakable until a
stranger passed by who enquired into the cause of their lamenta-
tions. He perceived at once where the trouble lay, and bade them
dip their noses into the sand and count the marks. They counted
nine and returned home full of thanks and gladness. The lesson
of this story is that if you count all, you ought not in your natural
modesty forget to count yourself also.
We agree with Dr, Montgomery that morality in a certain
sense is of human origin.:]: But the laws of human society are
nothing outside of the All. Dr. Montgomery must not exclude
himself and his fellowmen from the particulars which make up the
Cosmos.
How does a man .become moral ? Simply by conforming to
the laws of nature especially to the laws that build up human so-
ciety.
Dr. Montgomery detects no morality in a conformity to law
and mentions especially the law of gravitation. He says :
'It may at times be moral, or at least be eminently prudent to resist con-
" formity to the law of gravi ation ; as, for instance, when deadly enemies
" meet at the edge of a precipice. Cannibals who slay and devour their enemies
" conform more directly and completely to the cosmical laws of the All than
" the man who. Christlike, offers no violent resistance to those who attack
" him."
Dr. Montgomery has strange views as to conforming to laws.
He means by " conforming " a submission without any attempt to
adapt the situation to the occasion : we mean an adaptation to
the law so that the same power in nature that threatens to destroy
will be used to preserve and to build up. §
* Compare in Fundninenial Probtnns p. 205 the passage on the reality of
ideas and ideals. " Ideals are the most ' intense realities imaginable.'" etc.
t Compare with this article the chapters "The Oneness of Man and
Nature" and "Ethics and Natural Science " in Fundamsntnl Problems pp.
207,226.
i Ethics we should say is human, but morality is fcund also in the animal
kingdom.
§ Concerning the moral law of the Christian doctrine "Resist not evil,"
an explanation will be found in the leading article of No. 132. That the moral
law " Love thine enemy" develops naturally Prof. Max Mi'iUer has proved in
the articles "The Natural Origin of the Supernatural" (No. 1431 and "Re-
ligion, Natural" (No. 148.) Prof. Max Miiller quotes the great moral teachers
who lived before Christ, as having uttered the same doctrine as that of Christ.
The universality of the evolution of moral ideas proves that morality is of a
natural growth.
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Why is Cannibalism said to be more in conformity with the
laws of nature than morality. The ground on which Dr. Mont-
gomery maintains it, is not stated. However in the scale of evo-
lution the cannibal ranges lowest, while a moral man ranges highest,
md the moral man survives the cannibal.* Is a moral man less nat-
ural than a beast of prey ? Is he not a man. and in addition, a
moral man, beiaiisc- he understands more of nature's laws and con-
forms to them ?
That all human efforts to improve nature can be made by the
means of nature alone, is indubitable and can be disputed only for
the sake of controversy. JNlaudsley says (i. c. p. 525) :
"There is going on a recreation of nature by human means, but nature
' Yet nature is made better by no mean.
But nature makes that mean ; so, over that art,
Which, you Sly, aids to natare, is an art
That nature makes
Thii
Which does mend nature—change, rather
; but
The art itself is nature '. ' "— /( V«^v'j Tale.
MORALiry AND FATALISM.
The last mentioned misconception of Dr. Montgomery's leads
us to another error of his. He says that not only Darwinism
but also "the mechanical world conception is absolutely fata-
listic."
Dr. Montgomery, who claims to have entered the precincts
of modern thought by reproaching T/u- Open Court that it has not,
seems to be quite unfamiliar with one of our most profound thinkers,
who is fully imbued with modern thought. It is Professor Wil-
liam Kingdon Clifford.
Professor Clifford takes exactly the same position as does The
Open Coiii-I. That which is defined as " Religion " in The Open
Court, Clifford calls " cosmic emotion." In his article "Cosmic
Emotion " he says :
"The social organism itself is but a part of the universal cosmos, and like
" all else is subject to the uniformity of nature. The production and distri-
"bution of wealth, the growth and administrative machinery, the education
" of the race, these are cases of general laws which constitute the science of
" sociologv. The discovery of exact laws has only one purpose
—
the ^tidance
^' of conduct by means qfikemA The laws of political economy are as rigid
" as those of gravitation ; wealth distributes itself as surely as water finds its
"level. But the use we have to make of the laws of gravitation is not to sit
" down and cry ' Kismet .' ' to the flowing stream, but to construct irrigation
" works."
THE MECHANICAL EXPLANATION AND THE ORIGIN OF FEELING.
Dr. Montgomery says in his first article :
" The intrinsic animation of all matter is wholly antagonistic to the
" mechanical conception "
His argument is as follows ;
" If material particles were alive, were capable of originating from within
" any kind of motion, the entire mechanical world-structure would instantly
" fall into chaotic confusion."
Certainly it would, if life is to be interpreted as Dr. Mont-
gomery interprets it in the foot note, where he says of a brain
molecule that it " should wander from its place or path without an
adequate mechanical cause."
I have not as yet met among philosophers one whose idea
of life consists in his supposition ihat there is a capability of
'
' originating from within any kind of motion, " if by " originating "
is meant creating motion from nothing. Kant, with whose criticism
modern thought commences, calls every world-conception which
stands in contradiction to the mechanical principle " a philosophy
of indolence " (faule Weltweisheit.)
Let me quote as an instance the following passage from Kant :
" If people can free themselves from an old and unfounded prejudice as
well as from the philosophy of indolence which under a pious mien at-
* Morality and the principle of absolute non-resistance should not be con-
founded.
t The italics are ours.
tempts to hide a lazy ignorance, I hope to found upon irrefutable
sure conviction first that the world has a mechanical development out of
universal natural laws as the origin of its constitution, and secondly that the
mode of its me-hanical origin such as we have represented it, must be true."—
'
'
Reason is exceedingly interested," says Kant, ' ' in not drop-
ping the mechanism of nature in her creations, and in not passing
it by in their explanations ; because without it no comprehension
of the nature of things is possible"
But how is it as to the origin of the organized life of
plants and animals ? Can the mechanical principle be shown to hold
good here also ? Kant has not, and with the scientific material at
his disposal could not have succeeded in applying the mechanical
principle to the origin of organization. He says in another pas-
sage :
" I think we can say, in a certain sense and without exaggeration: Give me
matter, and I will build out of it a world, which means : Give me matter, and
I will show yo J how a world is to originate therefrom."
Having descrfbed the laws that shape planetary systems, Kant
continues :
" However, can we boast of the same advantage concerning plants and
insects ? Are we able to say. Give me matter, and I will show you how a grub
originates ? Do we not here stop at the first step, hampered by ignorance
concerning the true inner quality of the object and the complexity of its in-
ternal %'ariety ? It must not be wondered at if I dare to say : that rather the
formation of all the celestial bodies, the cause of their motion, in short the
origin of the whole present constitution of the world-structure will be com-
prehended, before we understand the generation by mechanical principles
of a single herb or grub."
Kant expresses himself very guardedly. He does not deny
that science will in time be able to arrive at a mechanical under-
standing of the origin of a plant or a grub. He do.'s not deny
that the process of life, so far as its motions are concerned, takes
place in strict accord to mechanical laws. And if he denied it,
how could he call any philosophy that attempts to set aside the
mechanical principle, faule We/t'ueisheil ?
* *
All that which Dr. Montgomery says about hylozoism is
irrelevant, because he takes the term in the s^nse which implies
that hylozoism believes in besouled atoms endowed with the old-
fashioned freewill, so that an atom might combine with another
atom, or if it pleased might not. Does he expect us to defend
that windmill ?
If the expression "originating from within any kind of mo-
tion " means the change of potential energy into kinetic energy,
then indeed every particle of matter is alive. The stone in your
hand, if you let it go, will originate motion from within. You need
not impart to it any energy. The potential energy is in the
stone. The stone being of a certain mass, its energy depends upon
its position at a certain distance from the centre of the earth. In
the sense that under special conditions things change a definite
amount of potential energy into its equivalent of kinetic energy
(i. e. motion) even stones are alive.—Will Dr. Montgomery deny
this ?
What is life in the usual and limited sense of the word, viz.,
the organized life of animals, but motion accompanied with some
kind of feeling ? Motion everywhere takes place according to strict
and irrefragable laws which we call mechanical. Energy every-
where remains energy, it never produces feeling. Energy may
seem to disappear, but it does not, it simply becomes latent and in
that case is called potential energy. Feeling however, is not a
product of motion, but feeling accompanies certain motions.
Dr. Montgomery's quotations are excellent, and as they corro-
borate our position we repeat them here. Locke says :
"Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect
body ; and motion, according 10 the utmost reach of our ideas, being able 10
produce nothing but motion, so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or
pain, or the idea of color or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond
our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our maker."
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And Leibnitz says ;
" We are constrained to confess that perception and whatever depends
upon it, are inexplainable upon mechanical principles; that is by reference
to forms and movements. If we could imagine a machine the operation of
which would manufacture thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, and could
think of it as enlarged in all its proportions, so that we could go into it as into
a mill, even then we would find in it nothing but particles jostling each othe:
and never anything by which perception could be explained."
We add a passage from Prof. Clifford :
"To say : ' Up to this point science can explain ; here the soul steps in,'
" is not to say what is untrue, but to talk nonsense But the question, do
"the changes in a man's consciousness run parallel with the changes of
" motion, and therefore with the forces in his brain ? is a real question, and
" not prima facie nonsense."
That which Clifford here characterises as " the stepping in of
the soul," Dr. Montgomery calls "the impulses of the hyperme-
chanical," which we shall take occasion to discuss later on.
We need not imagine that the motion of every single atom is
accompanied with feeling ; but we can, without commiting our-
selves maintain that the motions of all atoms are accompanied
with elements of feeling; and these ele.Tients of feeling produce
in certain combinations actual feelings.
Nature is not animated in the sense that there is a soul in
every stone
; yet nature is alive in the sense that all particles con-
tain the elements of life, so that the organized life of plants as
well as animals can and will sprout forth simply by organizing.
Let me add here that "the application of the mechanical
principle " is very different from that theory which Dr. Montgom-
ery calls "the mechanical world-conception." The mechanical
principle is applicable to all motions. Mechanics explains, i. a.
describes in the simplest and most comprehensive way, all kinds
of motion ; but mechanics does not deal with those things which
are not motions ; accordingly it does not and cannot be expected to
explain them. Mechanics for instance does not explain feelings.*
But the mechanical world-conception, as represented by Dr. Mont-
gomery, is supposed to explain everything by laws of motion.
The mechanical principle explains the motions of the heavenly
bodies; it e.xplains (viz., it describes in formulas most concisely
and at the same time exhaustively) gravitation, but it does not
exp'ain gravity. According to certain laws gravity under special
conditions makes matter move, or if a special lump of matter can
not move, it makes matter exert upon other matter a definite
pressure.
Dr. Montgomery says :
"According to the mechanical world-conception, life is not and can not
"be an original endowment of matter, but only a result of the peculiar me-
" chanical disposition and movement of aggregate particles."
There can be no objection to Dr. Montgomery's formulizing
and refuting a special idea of what he calls " the mechanical world-
conception." But objection must be made to his assertion that
this " mechanical world- conception " has ever been proclaimed or
defended in Tlii Open Court. On the contrary it has been rejected.
That view which has been defended is the application of the me-
chanical principle to all motions.
There is one more reason why to Dr. Montgomery all com-
plex motions the effects of which depend upon special combina-
tions or forms, will appear mysterious. He considers form as " a
causatively and ethically indiffertnt grouping of material par-
ticles."
A missionary who had lived among the Zulus, told me that he
once overheard the talk of two savages on the witchcraft of the
white man. "But look here, " the one said, " if I throw a piece
of iron into the water, it will sink. The white man brought to
our river several pieces of bent sheet-iron, and every single part
would sink if we threw it into the water. But the white man put
* This has been fully explained in Fundamental Problems " Can the world
be mechanically explained." p. 115-122.
the parts together, and although it was much heavier than our
canoes, it floated. I have seen it with my own eyes, and it is true
by my life." The other Zulu replied, " The white man can do this
only by witchcraft." These Zulus apparently believed that the
forms of things are " causatively indifferent."
If we misunderstand the importance of form, if we consider
it as "a causatively and ethically indifferent grouping of material
particles," we shall inevitably drop into mysticism, agnosticism,
or the belief in witchcraft. The belief in witchcraft develops
among theologians as supernaturalism, and among metaphysical
philosophers as a theory of " hypermechanical impulses."
THE HYPERMECHANICAL.
Dr. Montgomery says concerning Mr. Hegeler's comparison
of the soul to the phonograph :
" The same hypermechanical faculty which selects for reproduction among
" all registered luarks those intended for a special purpose, this same select-
" ive faculty imparts evidently also the corresponding impulses to the vocal
" chords. The process transcends altogether mechanical interpretation."
If the word "hypermechanical" means " non-raechanical "
we have no objection to the idea that there is something hyper-
mechanical, for feeling is indeed non-mechanical. Yet in that
case we must object to the proposition of Dr. Montgomery, that
the non-mechanical faculty "imparts impulses." The non-me-
chanical has nothing whatever to do with the mechanical, it can
impart no impulses. The idea of a non mechanical impulse is a
flat contradictio in adjectono less than the phrases ' a living corpse"
or ' a non-existent being.'
Dr. Henry Maudsley in his "Physiology of Mind," p. 70,
discusses the selective faculty with reference to Mr. Spencer's
comparison of the soul to a piano. Maudsley says ;
" ' Ideas.' Mr. Herbert Spencer remarks, (' Principles of Psychology,' Vol.
VII, p 485,) ' are like the successive chords and cadences brought out from
a piano, which successively die away as other ones are sounded. And it would
be as proper to say that these passing chords and cadences thereafter exist
in the piano, as it is proper to say that passing ideas thereafter exist in the
brain. In the one case as in the other, the actual existence is the structure
which under like conditions again evolves like combinnions The ex-
istence in the subject of any other ideas than those which are passing, is pure
hypothesis absolutely without evidence whatever.' This analogy, when we
look into it, seems more captivating, than it is complete. What about the
performer in the case of the piano and in case of the brain respectively ? Is
not the performer a not unimportant element, and necessary to the complete-
ness of the analogy ? The passing chords and cadences would have small
chance of being brought out by the plan 5 if they were not previously in his
mind. Where, then, in the brain is the equivalent of the harmonic concep-
tions in the performer's mind ? If Mr. Spencer supposes that the individual's
mind, his spiritual entity, is detached from the biain, and plays upon its ner-
vous plexures, as the performer plays upon the piano, his analogy is complete ;
but if not, then he has furnished an analogy which those who do take that
view may well thank him for. There is this difference between the passing
chords and cadences of the piano and the passing chords and cadences in the
brain—and it is of the essence of the matter—that, in the former case, the
chords and cadences do pass and leave no trace of themselves behind in the
structure of the piano ; while, in the latter case, they do not pass or die
away without leaving most important after-effects in the structure of the
brain ; whence does arise in due time a considerable difference between a cul-
tivated piano and a cultivated human brain, and whence probably have
arisen, in the progress of development through the ages, the ditferences be-
tween the brain of a primeval savage and the brain of Mr. Spencer. . . With
the brain, function makes faculty ; not so with the piano."
If you put the question to me, for instance, of how much iive
times five is ? I shall answer twenty-five. There is no hyperme-
chanical impulse that prompts the answer. There is not a select-
ive faculty in me, as Dr. Montgomery imagines, which among all
the numbers selects this and no other number. But there is a
memory structure which when innervated says : " five times five is
twenty-five." If any one asks : " How much is five times five ?"
it is this question which as soon as it is perceived, innervates the
memory structure " five times five is twenty-five ;" and possibly
it awakens many other memories' associated therewith. I may
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think of the teacher who first taught me arithmetic ; or the
picture of my multiplication table may appear before my eyes.
The answer " five times five is twenty-five " is under ordinary cir-
cumstances accompanied with feeling or consciousness.
Not every instance is so simple. There are of course mental
processes that are much more complicated, but there is not one in
which the motions that take place in the brain can be thought of
as being not strictly in accordance with mechanical laws whether
molecular or molar.
Take for instance the present situation of my mind. Dr.
Montgomery maintains of thought and also of the rauscle-innerva-
tion of speech that " this process transcends altogether mechan-
ical interpretation," and he believes that a " hypermechanical
faculty " steps in, which for all I know about this most modern
inierpretation of mental activity, might be the soul. In hearing
or reading these propositions a whole army of memories is aroused
in my brain. All my conceptions about mechanics and its rigid
applicability to all sorts of motion awaken. There is not a select-
ive faculty in my brain which rouses these conceptions from their
latency, but the reading of Dr. Montgomery's words irritates them
and sets them in motion. The process, on the one hand, is in its
causal nexus as much mechanical as any irritation that produces a
reflex action. It is, on the other hand, not mechanical in so far only
as these motions in my brain are accompanied with feelings. The
word " hypermechanical " finds among the memories of my brain
no clear conceptions as to what the word can mean. Yet there is
somewhere a maxim" registered '• Strive for clearness of thought,"
and there is near by an aversion against words which convey no
definite ideas. The maxim and the aversion are registered in my
brain in the shape of nervous structures. Both are irritated,
the one immediately after the other, so that a reaction takes place
which finds verbal expression in a complaint about the doctor's
vagueness.
There is a peculiar feature in soul-life which consists in the
limitation of consciousness. Similarly as in vision only one object
at a time can be in the central field of vision, viz., in the yel-
low spot where vision is most intense, so in consciousness one idea
only, one combination of ideas, one perception, or a thought
concerning a perception, one aim, or one activity can at one time
fill this centre of mental life. When several ideas are awakened,
that which at the time is strongest will attain a state of conscious-
ness. As soon as it has been attended to, it naturally loses its
interest, and another idea, which in the mean time has become the
strongest will follow. A combination of both may take place and
thus new thoughts, discoveries, inventions, ideals, may grow from
such beginnings.
The chief progress modern psychology has made, is that it is
no more in need of what Dr. Montgomery calls the selective
faculty, and which he can explain in no other way than by the sup-
position of "hypermechanical impulses" "The hypermechan-
ical faculty," he says, "selects for reproduction among all regis-
tered marks those intended for a special purpose."
Dr. Montgomery professes " to deny definitely the existence
of a separate deity and the personal continuance after death." In
one word he rejects supernaturalism. However, what is his
"hypermechanical" but supernatural? Is it not supernatural-
ism in a new shape ? I must confess that the old supernatural-
ism in its naive grandeur combined with its ethical importance
appears to me much more imposing than Dr. Montgomery's
artificial view of the hypermechanical.
SUMMARY.
In reviewing the whole criticism I am struck with the fact
that Dr. Montgomery everywhere criticizes himself. Dr. Mont-
gomery is a gentleman of unusual learning, but his learning is like
a vast labyrinth in which he has lost his way. The task of ar-
ranging all the facts of science into an orderly and monistic system
is not so hopeless as Dr. Montgomery imagines. If he would only
give up the idea that his own views represent the modern and
most progressed phase of science, he might discover that in many
quarters of the world thought has progressed beyond those doubts
which he has not yet overcome.
Dr. Montgomery has struggled in vain to acquire clear ideas
about several vital points ; his attempts to overbridge the gap
that yawns between subject and object are frustrated. The one-
ness of matter and mind appear from his standpoint as a mystery.
He has tried in vain to find the mechanical explanation of mental
processes and he has not succeeded in overcoming the fatalism
that is apparently attached to the conception that the world is
throughout determined by law. The criticisms presented by him
must be criticisms of those solutions which Dr. Montgomery sup-
poses to be possible, for certainly they are throughout different
from the views set forth in The Open Court. Dr. Montgomery
aspires to be a monist, and be presents here the difficulties which
hinder Jiiiit from realizing that unitary world-conception wh ch
Jit: understands by the term monism. We fully agree with Dr.
Montgomery that the monism which he criticizes is an unteuible
view.
The unsolved problems wiih which Dr. Montgomery troubles
himself are not quite unfamiliar to me. I have to some extent also
busied myself with the history of philosophy, and I found my-
self in the same mazes when I attempted to escape from the un-
tenable position of supernaturalism. My orthodox teichers, as
well as many earnest searchers for truth in the liberal camp, assented
to certain complaints about the insufficiency of monism; and that
kind of monism was much the same mechanical world-conception as
that of which Dr. Montgomery speaks. It was maintained that from
the standpoint of a mechanical world-conception, (i) life could not
be explained because feeling is no motion and cannot originate
from motion, (2) that ethics was impossible because of the fa'alism
of the mechanical view, and (3) it afforded us no assistance in over-
bridging the gap between subject and object. One hope only
seemed left, that an unexpected discovery would be made which
might serve to reconcile all those contradictions, as there might be
a monistic root out of which matter and mind had grown. Body
and mind would then, be proved to have " a common origin in one
and the same underlying reality. " This is the phase in which
Dr. Montgomery has become stationary.
As soon as philosophy began to despair of ever finding the
monistic root it became agnosticism. The verdict was pronounced :
The underlying reality is unknowable. When a thinker goes
beyond his depth he fondly imagines he has reached the unfa-
thomable. The unfathomable being attained, it appeared as if
the last word had been spoken and the history of philosophy was
closed. Thus agnoticism bringfs progress to a halt.
Dr. Montgomery's criticism is a most valuable contribution
when considered as the key to the thought of a past period in the
history of philosophy. This epoch which Dr. Montgomery repre-
sents is most interesting and the difficulties with which human
thought was then struggling should neither be forgotten nor
underrated. p- c.
CURRENT TOPICS.
While the political world is convulsed with national and inter-
national questions of mighty import, before which American states-
manship stands baffled and confused ; while society in its com-
prehensive unity is disturbed and bewildered by the portentous
conflict going on between capital and labor ; while the revision of
creeds is filling the religious world with misgivings and doubt, it
adds to the general anxiety that the fashionable world, " society
"
in its narrow and exclusive character, is tormented by a dispute
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over a question of etiquette, precedence, and pride. There is
gloom in Vanity Fair. Some envious woman has, figuratively
speaking, thrown an apple of discord into the Post Office at New-
port, in the form of a letter addressed to " Mrs. Astor." It ap-
pears that a golden tint is given to the Newport " season " by the
presence of two ladies, each bearing the name of " Astor." One
of ihem is the widow of the late possessor of the Astor title, and
the other is the wife of the present owner. One is Mrs. William,
and the other is Mrs. William W.; but this coincidence is not in
the discussion ; the problem for solution is not who shall bear the
name of Astor, but who shall wear the title ? Which of them is
"Mrs." Astor in the " etiquettical " meaning of the word ? The
elder lady claims that any letter addressed to " Mrs. Astor," with-
out the prefix William, John, or Barnaby, belongs to her, by right
of seniority, as the widow of tlie Astor recently deceased ; but the
younger lady claims that such a letter must be meant for her as
the wife of t/ie Astor now alive. As the founders of the American
republic in their zeal for lighter matters, neglected to provide a
court of Heraldry to determine rival claims of rank and prece-
dence, the Astor quarrel must for a time remain unsettled, to the
grief of our nobility and the perplexity of snobs.
It seems probable at this moment that the Astor precedence
question will involve the government itself in trouble. The in-
flammation of it has already spread to New York, and the post-
master of that city has given due and timely notice that he will
not sit on either horn of the dilemma, when, the Newport season
being over, the Astors return home. He has made the harrowing
promise, a threat it may be almost called, that if the claim of pre-
cedence between those ladies be not settled, he will not give either
of them any letter addressed simply to "Mrs. Astor, New York
City." The dire consequence of this determination he does not
see. It throws the celestial "four hundred" into high-toned
anarchy, because persons writing to either of those ladies will
give offense unless the title and distinction in dispute be written in
the letter, and outside on the envelope. As both of them will
demand all the letters in the Post Office addressed to ' ' Mrs. Astor "
and as the postmaster will refuse to deliver them, the interference
of the Postmaster-General must be invoked, and a cabinet meeting
called. Should the cabinet be divided on the question, as is likely,
it may be necessary to appeal for social safety to an act of con-
gress. There is an easy solution of the problem if " Society " will
only follow it. As all the difficulty has arisen out of a servile
imitation of English aristocracy, why not compel the English to
help u.T out by copying them all through ? When two English
ladies have the same title, as always happens when a nobleman
dies, leaving a widow and a married son, all jealousy is avoided
by conferring upon the widow the additional title " Dowager."
Why not call the elder " claimant " in this case, the Dowager Mrs.
Astor ? American snobbery has gone farther than that some-
times in a simian mimicry of patrician style. What would the
old original Astor have said when peddling his humble wares
through the city of New York, had he foreseen that his descendants
in the third or fourth generation would be quarreling over a
question of spurious nobility ? And supposing some future Astor
three or four generations hence, peddling notions like the founder
of the family, what will he think of it ?
The counterfeit monarchy at Washington is responsible for the
adulteration of American manners, by a foolish endeavor to refine
them with an infusion of courtly style. We import ceremonials
from Windsor Castle, and export republican dignity. The tone
of society at the capital sets the fashion, and the population there
composed of government officials is graded " according to rank.
"
Out of this classification has grown a code of caste which earns
for us the derision of those orders of nobility whose rule of pre-
cedence we have adopted for 'our guide. I have lately seen a
newspaper which in ridicule of our servility declares that this ar-
tificial royalty is the work of silly women at Washington who try
to set the fashions. Some of it no doubt is due to silly women,
but more to silly men. For instance, here is an item which ought
to be read with reverential awe, I quote it from a Boston paper :
" It would be regarded as a high breach of judicial' etiquette for
Judge Brewer to go to dinner or to enter a carriage before Judge
Miller or Judge Field." When "grave and reverend Signiors "
like the judges of the Supreme Court, stand thus upon ceremony,
shall we call women " silly " for quibbling about precedence ?
No people in the world are so greedy as we are for titles, de-
corations, medals, badges, crests, cockades, and ceremonial mum-
mery and flummery. As titles of nobility are forbidden by the
organic law of the republic, we evade the prohibition by convert-
ing official designations into titles personal. The Secretary of
State in his office, may be properly addressed as " Mr. Secretary,"
but elsewhere he is only " Mr. Blaine," and genuine courtesy in
private life will not label or tag him with any other title than that
which is common to us all. In Europe titles actually belong by
law to the persons wearing them, but official station confers no
personal rank in England. Mr. Gladstone although Prime Minis-
ter, was only " Mr." Gladstone, and any person presuming to
patronize him or to flatter him as " Mr. Prime Minister " would
be laughed at as a snob. Only in the United States was he dimi-
nished by the titles "Premier" Gladstone, "Prime Minister"
Gladstone, and cheapness of that kind. We lower the American
standard when we adopt those tinsel vanities, which our Consti
tution has discarded as frivolous, aristocratic, and absurd. In this
age real titles are impertinent, imitations mean.
The tawdry fashion of giving a woman her husband's title has
spread from Washington to Tombstone. It has changed our pride
into vanity, and shrivelled ijp courtesy while trying to expand it.
The papers are to blame for some of this, because the bribe of a
chicken bone and a glass of wine, will turn "our special reporter "
nto a Jenkins in yellow plush livery, and with a footman's rapture
he will tell us that " Mrs. Commissioner Biggs gave a brilliant
reception last evening, at which we noticed Mrs. General Diggs,
and the charming Mrs. Alderman Figgs, accompanied by her beau-
tiful daughter Mrs. Senator Jiggs, who kept up a lively conversa-
tion with Mrs. Representative Riggs," and so on down to the
bottom of the stairs. The people who pay these flatteries are
snobs, and so are the people who accept them. Trades, as well
as offices, are titles now. I once had the honor of an introduction
to a lady who promenaded through " Society" as Mrs. Conductor
Gaines ; her husband was a conductor on the railroad. A few
days ago a newspaper, telling about the burning of a building in
Chicago, said that "Elevator Operator Gibbs," first noticed the
smoke. That was the stately title given to the boy who run the
'•lift." More extravagant than even that was the grim and
gloomy title given to " Death-Watch Osborn ", a man whose duty
it was to sit up with a convict sentenced to be hanged. In con-
ferring this title we touched bottom, and this justifies the hope
that a reaction will set in toward a simplicity of manners and
address worthy of a sensible people.
*
* *
In a recent number of the Illustrated London Ne-os appears
this item, "The Archbishop of Canterbury and Mrs. Benson
gave a garden party last Thursday at Lambeth Palace." The
American mind wonders what Mrp. Benson had to do with it, not
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suspecung that Mrs. Benson is the Archbishop's wife. Although
the Archbishop has a high seat in the House of Lords, and is in
fact a peer of parliament, with precedence above all the peers ex-
cept the royal dukes, he has no personal title like the Duke of
Richmond, or the Earl of Derby, and consequently his wife has
none. She is therefore only Mrs. Benson. Should Mrs. Benson
visit the United States she would be made miserable by the
kindly blunders of the press addressing her as ' ' Mrs. .Archbishop of
Canterbury Benson." This descriptive name is awkward enough,
but it is not more stupid than the latest and most popular styles
of address now in common use, as for instance, "Mrs. Chief of
the Bureau of Statistics, Brown," and others more cumbersome
than that.
A good word was invented about the time of the war to de-
scribe a mushroom aristocracy,— Shoddy. This word should be
carefully preserved. Every attempt to divide us into castes based
either on wealth or official station, emanates from the sect of
Shoddy. In the temple of Shoddy the pews rent high, and people
must have a good deal of money before they can get into the re-
served seats. To be orthodox we must be born and married in
the current style ; and we must die and be buried in a fashionable
way, if we hope to go to heaven. It is low and common to be
buried in a coffin; nothing but a " casket " will suit us now.
Even our good old mother tongue is too cheap for the sect of
Shoddy. We must eat and drink in the French language. I have
before rae at this moment a Cincinnati Crtct'/Zf describing a brilliant
reception given by Mrs. Blank. This lady gave the paper a cat-
alogue of what she had for supper. Every thing was in the
French language, except one solitary article. This was " Punch,"
which appears at the bottom of the catalogue in honest Anglo-
Saxon. It never occurred to Mrs. Blank, that in publishing the
" Menu " she was giving her guests a hint that they did not often
get such luxuries, and was confessing at the same time, that they
were also rarities with her. In imitating the manners and customs
of any foreign aristocracy we confess our own inferiority, and are
sure to blunder. Our social customs ought to be in harmony with
our political organization, republican and American forever.
M. M. TRUMBULL.
CORRESPONDENCE.
THE BRAIN THEOREM OF SENTIENT BEING.
'COGITO (SENTIO) = SUM" ; NOT £^GO SUM.
"/"ha ; presumed.Into the Heaven of He
A mortal guest and drawn empyreal air.
To the Editor of The Open Court :—
I SHOULD be glad, with the consent of the Editor, to be allowed
to make, in the columns of The Open Court, a further brief minute
on the above topic ; viz., that Cogitation, or Mentation, is an or-
ganic cerebral process, function, or symptom, asymptote of which
supreme form of consciousness all sense, or thought, and their ob-
jects, were not even the shadow of a shade.
I know well the Zoilus-like (not Zola-like) odium inseparable
from this ungrateful duty, in the past and present conditions of
human opinion. Especially in the routine, innovation-detesting
and un-idea-ed Anglo-Saxon industrial communities, in which Mr.
Carnegie of Pittsburg emphatically declares that a liberal educa-
tion is fatal to success in business. But my syntax, which as /<?>-
alipomenon, I have always sought to differentiate from pure " dis-
covery " is so naive, and at bottom now-n-days, so much of an
obvious truism, that I do not despair of making it intelligible to
at least what M. Arnold calls "a remnant" even of that hide
bound race. And if so, though to myself, who look to events not
to dialectics, for the realization of my Ideal, this pis nl/c-r is but
the half-way house, the gain is probably worth the labor it entails.
It is only, I cannot too often repeat, Protn^vrijs JxediriTKs, Berk-
leyism shorn of its Absolutism, Locke without his "intentional
species " and other media bitween'brain and its action, and Kantist
negation of "thing in itself" without the mysticism and self-con-
tradiction inseparable from Metaphysics and Psychology. It quite
negatives, and dispenses with what is misnamed "Soul," either
in Microcosm or Macrocosm, which two are one organic whole,
and hence makes Body, or Leili (Life) and its functions, offices, or
properties the Be-all and End-all of vital existence—a consum-
mation more than apocalyptic and utterly fatal to all reconcilia-
tion between Religion and Science. The latter now expatiates
in empyreal regions that dwarf all old world conceptions of Poetry,
Prophecy or Devotion. And yet its scope is as simple and self-
evident as Schiller, in h\5 Letters on the .TLsthetic Education of Man,
explains of the practical side of the Critical Philosophy, of which
Ueberweg affirms he was the most gifted disciple. Schiller's words
are " that when freed from its technical form it connotes the im-
memorial assumptions (Anspriiche) of universal instinct implanted
in his own nature in Man as Guardian, till scientific insight [Rea-
son] makes him his own master (miindig)." What we understand
by Induction is therefore only a full ;vcognition of what, as in-
stinct, was always potentially present as adumbration. As Luther
translates the Greek term Metanoia resipiscence or a ;vfinding of
our primal Self— a conception worked out poetically by Words-
worth in his sublime verses and in his Ode to Immortality from
recollections of childhood— written at Tintern Abbey. In an essay
on Induction and Deduction lately published, under my care, this
view—the Platonic and Pythagorean doctrine of Vision and Re-
vision minus the absurdity of Metempsychosis—is well traced home
by the late Miss Naden, rectifying the, in essentials, misleading
representation of Lord Macaulay, in his monograph on Bacon,
and of Buckle in his/«;'fl'c-method of John Hunter. Descartes's
famous formula, at which, inscribed on the pedestal of his statue
at Tours I have seen " intelligent " British tourists guflawing as
bottled moonshine, requires, therefore, the modification above
noted in my motto. The Ergo is quite superfluous, and indeed
inhibitory, as soon as we are conscious that in the only sphere of
Relationalism and Rationalism, with which our, and other races
have any concern. Being and Thinking (which latter is only a
special mode of general sensation or Coenesthesis) as parallelisms
are one and indivisible. So that the primeval savage, u'hi/e un-
sophisticated, is at one with the latest scientific induction—the real
heresiarch and schismatic being the savage Thaumaturge or Oc-
cultist, and the specialist, scientist, and literate. Of Religion and
Divine worship I need only say a word. For if we can never
escape from Selfhood, and if all knowledge be an Autopsy, Nar-
cissus-like Self-adoration can be the only form in which Idolatria
can be exercised. It will be found that this hylo-ideal monism
strongly arraigns "Xature," not as pessimistic exactly, but as hap-
hazard, capricious, unjust, immoral and so cruel and inhuman as
impossibly to be the design and execution of an all-wise, all-powerful
and all-benevolent and fatherly Demiurge. The plain fact is that
when we quote the Semitic Biblical phrase " God's ways are not
our ways, nor his thoughts our thoughts," we cut ourselves adrift
from Deity altogether and abjure in toto the possibility of a super-
human basis for human thought and morals. Even Kant says:
" It is reflecting reason that brought design into the world and ad-
mires a wonder created by itself." Wordsworth claims that Nature
never betrays the heart that loves and trusts her. But the false-
hood of the claim is at once demonstrated by the single fact that
his sister and alter idem to whom the sentiment was addressed be-
came a howling maniac (See Cyrus Redding's Recollections) before
she reached middle age. My chief aim—though by no means my
only one—is, like Lucretius, to unmask and impeach the false
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Daessa Natural Religion and with it, of course, all Revelation,
Protestantism, though an advance on Greek or Latin Christianity-
products of the very darkest ages of civil history, has b;en, from
its origin at the Revival of Learning, when it was promulgated as
a plea for private judgment and the supremacy of the individual,
or selfish conscience, all along fatally handicapped by Bibliolatry.
Without that constraining influence Luther would have been en-
tirely Atlieos. I submit that this auto-plastic Cerebro-Cosmism is
in the line of the Lutheran protest against Authority, while en-
tirely divested of the soul-cramping cerements which mar and
vitiate nil Theology. The study of comparative Religions quite
nullifies all of them. Hope for radical human amelioration seems
vain that does not start from self-amelioration. Mere technology,
or Realist Scientism, by specialization is a fertile
—
perhaps tlic
most fertile—source of degeneration. Luther died despairing of
Humanity, confessing that the Reformation had injured rather
than forwarded human welfare. And Professor Huxley, in his
article Anarchy and Regimentation, in the May number of the
Nineteenth Century re-echoes, on anti-spiritualist data, the same
pessimism. Luther's despair applied notably to the birth-place of
his revolt. No one can deny, unless, like Mr. Gladstone, fanati-
cized by Biblical pietism, that nations, in their religious phase,
are retrograde and retroactive. Early in the i6th century Ger-
many was on a par, in civilization, with the other nations of
Europe. But as soon as Religion became a serious and dominant
life-factor, the Fatherland sank rapidly into barbarism and an-
archy, as well portrayed in Schiller's ' Wallenslein's Camp.' The
Kilkenny cat catastrophe is a type of her 200 years long Skiamachy.
Only in the reign of the Infidel Frederick II. of Prussia did the
mother, nurse, and xnartyr of the Reformation slowly emerge from
her suicidal vertigo or Schtuindel. Its turning point can hardly be
located earlier than the issue by Lessing, of the Legacy of Reima-
rius. And even Frederick, " the greatest of German sons," to his
dying day, refused to credit the possibility of German emergence
from Gothic barbarism. And, as of Germany, so of Geneva,
Scotland, Holland, Huguenot France, Puritan England, short,
but sharp paroxysm and the more prolonged obscurantism of
New England ending in Arianism and Indifferentism. Only now
are we fully able, from the triumph of the scientific method all
along the line—in the moral, no less than in the physical sphere
one and indivisible, by killing not scotching, to get rid of this fatal
Dens ex machina and succulms. All the leading esprits forts of the
iSth Century, with the exception of D'Holbach and the leading
scientific pioneers, as Laplace, and others, to which "remnant"
Condorcet and the other Gerondist leaders belonged, were hope-
lessly entangled in the maze of Dualism (Theism), none the more
hopeleS:ly than Voltaire, Rousseau, and Paine. Hence the French
Terror under Robespierre and other Jacobin sentimentalists, or
theophilanthropists, and the ^^xK\s\. fiasco of the French Revolu-
tion, as of its homologues the Reformation and Reign of the Saints.
Let ?M, at least of this generation, not be untrue to our preroga-
tives and vantage ground, neglect of which, as anachronism, must
be guilt and blunders of the deepest dye, in all who aspire to teach
or rule the hapless race of Mankind. Till the little " World God "
sees and acts on the principle that he is to himself Heno-theos
and Theotikos, Reason, I repeat, is tattoo. Henism (.\utc-Monism)
proper and Heno-theism as Dualism are clearly mutually exclusive.
Man must himself—each one for himself alone—work out his own
salvation (health, physical and moral) not by craven fear and
trembling but by justifiable confidence in his own un-aided power,
and in the assurance that happiness and its opposite are physio-
logical states. As before stated, ad nauseam, Salvation, Saint,
Sanctity, and all their derivatives and generally all "spiritual"
phraseology, are but forms of such concrete somatic states. Keep,
or regain, somatic health, including cerebral,—and that sunshine
of the breast—the peace, salam, or A'ief of the Oriental
—
passing
all expression or understanding, is our very own. Heaven and
Earth and Hell, Past, Present and Future become thus the con-
tents of our own bodil)' life or Leil'. Nirvana—the archetype of
all later Ideals, and Bliss including the Christian—can have no
other well-spring than this serene frictionless balance of organic
function.
" Hereditary bondsmen, know ye not,
Who would be free themselves must strike the blow ! "
To sum up. In Hylo-idealism, which includes Hylo-zoism
and the relational nature of knowledge, as well as Evolutionalism,
as propounded, not by Darwin, but by ancient Greek sages—is
implicit the seeming paralogism and real Paradox that etch cal-
varinin or skull cap covers the whole realm of the internal and ex-
ternal "universe" i. e., of all subjective and objective knowledge.
Outside Consciousness, whose seat is the Sensorium, can be only
nullity. Even Chaos is de trap for such Agnosis. For under that
osseous arch, as vulgarly said of the hat, lies the organism well
pictured in recent numbers of The Open Court, in which, and by
which, are transacted all the manifestations of Existence. With-
out this vesiculo-neurine pulp or marrow all could only be blank,
unconscious nullity. R. Lewins, M, D.
BOOK REVIEWS.
The Work of the Ministry. Lectures to the Meadville Theo-
logical School. By Rev. W. L. Tilden. Boston : Geo. H. Ellis.
These lectures have been published at the request of the stu-
dents of the school to which they were given, and we think their
venerable author has done wisely in yielding, as he expresses it in
his dedication, "the distrust of age to the sanguine judgment of
youth." The resolutions which led Mr. Tilden thus to act refer
to his lectures as containing words full of the spirit of manly
Christianity, and as having proceeded " from the experiences of a
long and useful life, devoted to disinterested and noble service of
the Christian ideals." The small volume is, indeed, full of wise
counsels to the Christian minister and contains much that laymen
may read with profit. Mr. Tilden dwells largely on the importance
of personal influence and personal character. Without the former
nothing can be done, but the nature of the work depends on per-
sonal character, which is an essential element of success to all
teaching, but especially of religious and moral teaching. The real
value of these lectures consists in the stress they lay throughout
on the great importance of that element.
Dr. Montgomery says of Mr. Hegeler (p. 2462); " He ob-
viously believes with most unsophisticated observers that things
really exist as we perceive them ; that they actually consist of the
tangible stuff we call matter." The error in this statement, Mr.
Hegeler declares, lies in the little word "we." That something
which we call "matter," is eternal. There was a time when
that which Dr. Montgomery calls " we," did not exist. Mr. He-
geler explained his opinion concerning the origin of the ideas that
constitute the " I " or " we " in his essay The Basis of Ethics (No. i
of The Open Court), from which we quote the following passage :"
" If a child sees an apple for the first time, the lens of the eye
" will throw a photograph of it on the retina, which photograph,
" as we now know, is fixed there for a short time, in a similar way
" as in a photographer's camera. From this photograph, through
" nerve-fibres, an analogue of the photograph is assumed to be
" brought to the gray matter of the child's brain, making a record
"there upon living, feeling matter; this has received the name
" photogram—in this case the photogram of an apple
" If the child sees the apple again at another time, it is the
"living, feeling photogram of an apple resulting from its first
"sight, which is stimulated thereby and feels, or, as we say, be-
" comes conscious of the apple. This photogram is the ego, for the
" instant."
